knot-dns-users

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7 participants
768 discussions

by Randy Bush

deb13 knot 3.5.6 i just want a few stats for a few zones, a la mod-stats: - id: custom server-operation: on query-type: on and it is a one-shot, i just want a one day sample is there a brutally simple way to get them out? yes, i can be attracted to shiny objects such as prometheus/grafna, which i use for other purposes. but ... i hesitate to run prometheus on the dns server, it has enough to do. i do have prometheus running with grafana on a remote host. knot-exporter leads me down a `python3 -m venv foo` rabbit hole, which feels pretty weird and unnatural and do i really need to do all this just to get simple stats out? randy

1 den, 3 hodiny

Knot DNS 3.5.6 release

by Daniel Salzman

Hello Knot DNS users, CZ.NIC has released Knot DNS 3.5.6. This is a bug-fix release with a security fix for ACL evaluation. Upgrade is recommended if certificate hostname verification is enabled. Note that Knot DNS 3.5 is not compatible with LMDB 1.x. The upcoming Knot DNS version 3.6, which is expected to be released in two months, will support automatic migration of LMDB databases to version 1.x. Changelogs: https://gitlab.labs.nic.cz/knot/knot-dns/raw/v3.5.6/NEWS Download: https://www.knot-dns.cz/download/ Documentation: https://www.knot-dns.cz/documentation/ Support: https://www.knot-dns.cz/support/ Regards, Daniel

6 dní, 21 hodin

LMDB version compatibility issues

by Anand Buddhdev

Hi Knot DNS developers, I've seen the discussion about the breaking changes between LMDB 0.9 and 1.0. I understand that Knot DNS 3.6 will have some magic in it to automatically migrate the databases. However, my concern is about the installation of LMDB itself. Currently, our Knot DNS packages depend on the "lmdb-libs" package from the distribution (RedHat and derivatives), and it is version 0.9.x. RedHat is conservative, is unlikely to update to 1.0, because that would break everything, so I expect the RedHat packages to remain at 0.9. Will the new Knot DNS require newer LMDB, and if so, is it expected that we'll have to roll our own packages for LMDB? Or do you intend to bundle LMDB with Knot DNS as you do with some other libraries? Regards, Anand Buddhdev RIPE NCC

1 týden

[heads up] upgrading lmdb to version 1.0

by Michael Grimm

Hi, I do want to point out: http://www.lmdb.tech/doc/upgrading.html tl;dr dump your databases *before* upgrading. I got bitten by this on FreeBSD and had had to fall back to lmdb 0.93.5 Has anyone succeeded in this migration your knot databases to lmdb 1.0? Which knot databases are involved? (journal, timers, kasp, …?) Thanks and regards, Michael

3 týdny, 1 den

knot blocked

by Erwan David

Hello Each action I try to do on knot gets the error error: failed to load configuration file '/usr/local/etc/knot/knot.conf' (MDB_BAD_TXN: Transaction must abort, has a child, or is invalid) What can I do ? (configuration not changed recently)

3 týdny, 1 den

Regarding multi-signer operations

by Smith

Hi I have two questions about this blog post on multi-signers: https://en.blog.nic.cz/2025/05/07/knot-dns-in-a-complex-dnssec-topology/ First, the blog post shows auto-increment SOA serial mode for the zone files in-line with the docs example: ``` zonefile-sync: -1zonefile-load: difference-no-serial journal-content: all ``` This would work fine for me in general, I don't mind zone files being the "source of truth". But the docs has a note "This mode is not suitable if the zone can be modified externally (e.g. DDNS, knotc)." Do I understand correctly that this is because any dynamic changes to the zone get wiped on reboot ? So, for example, if the only external DDNS modification in my environment is DNS-01 for cert issuance, it won't cause me a problem, because those are ephemeral by nature anyway ? This then raises the second question, how would I deal with catlog zones with this concept of multi-signers ? Or are catlog zones too much trouble in a multi-signer environment ? Thank you

3 týdny, 1 den

Yubikey HSM

by Ulrich Wisser

Hello! Has anybody here got knot to sign with a Yubikey HSM? Asking for a friend! :-) /Ulrich

4 týdny

what does "disposal of old contents blocked by outstanding zone transfer" mean?

by Jan-Piet Mens

Hello! I'm testing periodic key rollovers in a playground running Knot DNS 3.5.4 (I am aware that 3.5.5 is out, but this message is also in the current source code) Zone transfers are not being performed, neither incoming nor outgoing (the latter occasionally to see zone content as shown below). At the completion of each signing operation (with purposely very short timings), I see the following debug output: 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, signing zone 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, KSK rollover started 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, next key action, KSK tag 18749, submit at 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, key, tag 15175, algorithm ECDSAP256SHA256, KSK 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, key, tag 14234, algorithm ECDSAP256SHA256, public, active 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, key, tag 60870, algorithm ECDSAP256SHA256, KSK, public, active 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, key, tag 18749, algorithm ECDSAP256SHA256, KSK, public, active+ 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, signing started 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, successfully signed, serial 94, new RRSIGs 3 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, next signing at 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 info: [b.net.] zone file updated, serial 93 -> 94 2026-06-19T08:39:32+0000 debug: [b.net.] disposal of old contents blocked by outstanding zone transfer 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, signing zone 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 notice: [b.net.] DNSSEC, KSK submission, waiting for confirmation 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, key, tag 15175, algorithm ECDSAP256SHA256, KSK 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, key, tag 14234, algorithm ECDSAP256SHA256, public, active 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, key, tag 60870, algorithm ECDSAP256SHA256, KSK, public, active 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, key, tag 18749, algorithm ECDSAP256SHA256, KSK, public, ready, active+ 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, signing started 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, successfully signed, serial 95, new RRSIGs 6 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 info: [b.net.] DNSSEC, next signing at 2026-07-03T06:45:11+0000 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 info: [b.net.] zone file updated, serial 94 -> 95 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 debug: [b.net.] disposal of old contents blocked by outstanding zone transfer 2026-06-19T08:40:42+0000 info: [b.net.] DS check, outgoing, remote 127.0.0.2@53 TCP, key p01., KSK submission check: negative 2026-06-19T08:40:52+0000 info: [b.net.] DS push, outgoing, remote 127.0.0.2@53 TCP, key p01., success 2026-06-19T08:41:42+0000 info: [b.net.] DS check, outgoing, remote 127.0.0.2@53 TCP, key p01., KSK submission check: positive 2026-06-19T08:41:42+0000 notice: [b.net.] DNSSEC, KSK submission, confirmed The zone itself is trivially short: $ dig -p 5340 @127.0.0.1 b.net AXFR +noall +answer +onesoa | ldns-read-zone -s b.net. 60 IN SOA ns.b.net. root.b.net. 100 10800 3600 604800 3600 www.b.net. 60 IN HTTPS 0 b.net. ns.b.net. 60 IN AAAA 2001:db8:2::4444 ns.b.net. 60 IN A 192.0.2.42 b.net. 60 IN NSEC3PARAM 1 0 0 - b.net. 60 IN DNSKEY 257 3 13 zmXFV/KHpRk/E6l7oiRg2f2M+YpWxGqHFJtHmsAFl4KAxZPeiL2VIFLswpGnrwxO47//vz/I1VqsLhmUz9k35A== ;{id = 18749 (ksk), size = 256b} b.net. 60 IN DNSKEY 256 3 13 x9PPypMDeXRarFtYwxT5uvQjE/DHQd6g+NcF5FkVGDhz/+Xq2r3ZDfLXYUjW1ivoZHstnH5hSC4znp9oghlLfw== ;{id = 38612 (zsk), size = 256b} b.net. 60 IN TXT "DNS is innocent" b.net. 60 IN NS ns.b.net. and the IMO relevant bits of the configuration are: acl: - id: all_xfr address: [ 127.0.0.1 ] action: [ transfer, notify ] submission: - id: pdns_submission check-interval: 60s parent: pdns_remote parent-delay: 10s template: - id: default storage: "/tmp/zones" zonefile-load: difference file: "%s" policy: - id: autoFAST keystore: pemstore single-type-signing: off manual: off algorithm: ecdsap256sha256 ksk-shared: off ksk-lifetime: 1h zsk-lifetime: 2h delete-delay: 1h propagation-delay: 10s nsec3: on nsec3-iterations: 0 nsec3-salt-length: 0 nsec3-salt-lifetime: 0 cds-cdnskey-publish: rollover zone-max-ttl: 60s ksk-submission: pdns_submission ds-push: pdns_remote zone: - domain: b.net dnssec-signing: on dnssec-policy: autoFAST acl: [ all_xfr ] Ought I be worried about "disposal of old contents blocked by outstanding zone transfer"? I don't think I've noticed that before. A second zone which uses the same policy shows the same behaviour. Best regards, -JP

1 měsíc

Knot DNS 3.5.5 release

by Daniel Salzman

Hello Knot DNS users, CZ.NIC has released Knot DNS 3.5.5. This is a bug fix version with some improvements. Changelogs: https://gitlab.labs.nic.cz/knot/knot-dns/raw/v3.5.5/NEWS Download: https://www.knot-dns.cz/download/ Documentation: https://www.knot-dns.cz/documentation/ Support: https://www.knot-dns.cz/support/ Regards, Daniel

1 měsíc, 1 týden

[BUG] AXFR responses missing AA bit (RFC 5936 violation) in Knot 3.5.x

by Mateusz Masłowski

Hello, I would like to report a bug in Knot DNS 3.5.x where AXFR responses do not have the Authoritative Answer (AA) bit set, which appears to violate RFC 5936 §2.2. Affected versions tested: - 3.5.3 - 3.5.4 Packages tested: - cznic.1~bookworm Summary RFC 5936 §2.2 states: "Each DNS message returned by the AXFR server MUST have the AA bit set to 1." However, Knot DNS sends AXFR responses with flags set to qr only. The AA bit is not set in any of the messages in the transfer stream. As a result, strict secondary DNS servers, notably Windows Server DNS, reject such responses as invalid and abort the zone transfer. Expected behavior AXFR response messages should have the AA bit set. Expected flags: qr aa Actual behavior AXFR response messages have only the QR bit set. Actual flags: qr Possible root cause The function axfr_process_query() in src/knot/nameserver/axfr.c does not appear to call knot_wire_set_aa(). By contrast, the normal query path, via solve_answer() in internet.c, does set the AA bit, so SOA, A, and other authoritative responses are returned correctly. The AXFR code path appears to bypass this logic. Minimal reproducer dig @<knot-master> +tcp AXFR <zone> | head -2 Observed output: ;; flags: qr; The AA bit is missing. This can also be verified with tcpdump: byte 3 of each DNS message in the AXFR stream has value 0x80 / QR only, instead of 0x84 / QR + AA. -- Best regards, Mateusz Masłowski

1 měsíc, 2 týdny

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