Hi dear knot users,
Back again with a yet another question on the same subject. Hopefully this
time
the last one...
We are a sub domain:
sub.company.com, and in order to eanble DNSSEC, I need
to
enable DNSSEC on our knot zone
sub.company.com, and send the DS key to
company.com
DNS admins for publication in the parent.
My goal is to minimize the time between enabling DNSSEC and having our DS
key
published in the parent zone.
As it turns out, is it incredibly difficult for
company.com DNS admins to
schedule
a date/time to do this 'in sync' with us.
The parent zone is now asking me to simply enable DNSSEC, and send them the
DS
keys. They will then submit a support request for that already active DS key
to be
published into the
company.com DNS.
Thing is: They are not sure how quickly that support request would be
processed.
So we could potentially face a significant amount of time (hours, days) of
running
knot with DNSSEC, without the DS key publised at the parent.
(so basically: a broken chain of trust situation)
My question: How disastrous (if at all) would that be? What consequences (if
any) to expect?
Shouldn't result in much "damage", if any. If I were
you. I'd set
the "active" bit into the future. Thereby eliminating *any* problems
at all. If you don't do that; likely the only trouble you're likely
to incur will be with MXs (mail exchange) accepting mail from you.
So set the Active bit into the future. Then when the records are
added to your parent zones and announced. They may or may not yet
be active. But when that date in the future arrives. That will be
that. :-)
HTH
--Chris
Or is there perhaps another approach at this that we fail to see?
(other than asking
company.com to change their dns hosting)
(I was thinking perhaps: quickly enable dnssec, take note of the generated
DS key,
disable dnssec again, sent the DS key to parent, wait for it to become
published,
and then re-enable dnssec on knot)
Enjoy your weekends everybody!
MJ
Op 31-08-2021 om 12:04 schreef mj:
> ok, good to know!
>
> Thanks (again!) for the quick reply!
>
> MJ
>
> Op 31-08-2021 om 12:01 schreef Daniel Salzman:
>> Hi,
>>
>> The extra white space is just a redundant separation of a long hex string.
>> You can ignore it.
>>
>> Daniel
>>
>> On 8/31/21 11:49 AM, mj wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> We have a (hopefully last) follow-up question on the knot-generated
>>> dnssec keys for our domain.
>>>
>>> Our policy is is set to algorithm: ECDSAP256SHA256. Upon knot start, knot
>>> generates the key:
>>>
>>>> knotd[25835]: info: [
company.com.] DNSSEC, key, tag 54011, algorithm
>>>> ECDSAP256SHA256, KSK, public, ready, active+
>>>> knotd[25835]: info: [
company.com.] DNSSEC, key, tag 49404, algorithm
>>>> ECDSAP256SHA256, public, active
>>>> knotd[25835]: info: [
company.com.] DNSSEC, signing started
>>>
>>> Then we query the DS key to be published, the result is:
>>>
>>>> keymgr
company.com ds
>>>>
company.com. DS 54011 13 2
>>>> f0892debae240caa01827becdd3d3cb0ef2512f5691ca525895777571a67e680
>>>>
company.com. DS 54011 13 4
>>>>
462211ea3e8d3ea19a2ae803b926af8df851369527879911318f59ff72973a72452e3f29265c339c6a61537a778c43da
>>>
>>>
>>> Now the question. In most (if not all?) docs we read on the subject, the
>>> DS key looks something like:
>>>
>>>> knot-dns.cz. 3600 IN DS 54959 13 2
>>>> 268DE6EB7E0630953B8AF0F0037BF68FD10443BF01B5E17805AF94C2 6921897D
>>> or
>>>>
dnssec-tools.org. 21600 IN DS 9638 13 2
>>>> 92551AA25C4ADE8E2882FBF4BEB5B54F9D84379B153848852B68BB3C 793F4B0B
>>>
>>> note the spaces at the end of the key string.
>>>
>>> Our knot-generated DS key does not have a space in it.
>>>
>>> Is something wrong? Do we need to add a space somewhere, or..?
>>>
>>> Thanks again in advance for providing insight :-)
>>>
>>> MJ