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784 discussions

Knot refusing to use the PKCS #11 interface

by Full Name

I have a knot.conf file with the following keystore section: keystore: - id: TheBackend backend: pkcs11 config: "pkcs11:model=p11-kit-trust;manufacturer=PKCS%2311%20Kit;serial=1;token=System Trust" where the value assigned to the config keyword is obtained from the output from the GnuTLS p11tool command: $ p11tool --list-tokens Token 0: URL: pkcs11:model=p11-kit-trust;manufacturer=PKCS%2311%20Kit;serial=1;token=System%20Trust Label: System Trust Type: Trust module Flags: uPIN uninitialized Manufacturer: PKCS#11 Kit Model: p11-kit-trust Serial: 1 Module: p11-kit-trust.so Also in knot.conf I have policy: - id: manual manual: on zone: - domain: example.com storage: /var/lib/knot/zones/ file: example.com.zone dnssec-signing: on dnssec-policy: manual With all this in place, I launched the following from the CLI: # keymgr example.com. generate algorithm=ECDSAP256SHA256 This does not seem to be using the PKCS #11 library, as instructed in knot.conf. I debugged the command above and noticed that, at some before the signing operation itself is addressed, the keystore_load function from the Knot code base is invoked. This function takes several arguments, the second of which is a backend identifier. According to the keystore entry in knot.conf, this should be the PKCS #11 identifier KEYSTORE_BACKEND_PKCS11. However, what I see with the debugger is that the backend argument is, in fact, KEYSTORE_BACKEND_PEM. Even more intriguing (to somebody unfamiliar with the internal workings of Knot, at least) is that, before keystore_load is invoked, the check_keystore function is invoked and it evaluates the following conditional: if (conf_opt(&backend) == KEYSTORE_BACKEND_PKCS11 && conf_str(&config) == NULL) This conditional clearly succeeds - i.e. at that point the backend has been correctly identified as PKCS #11. But, like I said above, when keystore_load gets called later on, such is not the case any longer. Any idea as to what is going on here? Why is PKCS #11 not being used? In the config string above in knot.conf I tried replacing %23 and %20 with # and the space character, respectively. It made no difference. This all is happening with Knot 2.7.3.

7 let, 11 měsíců

Knot refusing to use the PKCS #11 interface II

by Full Name

More info on this: The keymgr command invokes first the init_confile function. This results in the following backtrace: #0 conf_db_get (conf=0x6bfcc0, txn=0x7fffffffe1b0, key0=0x47b76a "\bkeystore", key1=0x47b761 "\abackend", id=0x6c6648 "TheBackend", id_len=11, data=0x7fffffffdf70) at knot/conf/confdb.c:704 #1 0x0000000000410018 in conf_rawid_get_txn (conf=0x6bfcc0, txn=0x7fffffffe1b0, key0_name=0x47b76a "\bkeystore", key1_name=0x47b761 "\abackend", id=0x6c6648 "TheBackend", id_len=11) at knot/conf/conf.c:78 #2 0x0000000000417f4a in check_keystore (args=0x7fffffffe090) at knot/conf/tools.c:268 #3 0x000000000041777d in conf_exec_callbacks (args=0x7fffffffe090) at knot/conf/tools.c:62 #4 0x000000000040ebaa in finalize_previous_section (conf=0x6bfcc0, txn=0x7fffffffe1b0, parser=0x6ed560, ctx=0x6c6620) at knot/conf/base.c:506 #5 0x000000000040ee8d in conf_parse (conf=0x6bfcc0, txn=0x7fffffffe1b0, input=0x4783c7 "/etc/knot/knot.conf", is_file=true) at knot/conf/base.c:592 #6 0x000000000040f128 in conf_import (conf=0x6bfcc0, input=0x4783c7 "/etc/knot/knot.conf", is_file=true) at knot/conf/base.c:669 #7 0x000000000040b677 in init_confile ( confile=0x4783c7 "/etc/knot/knot.conf") at utils/keymgr/main.c:240 #8 0x000000000040bb70 in main (argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe488) at utils/keymgr/main.c:349 A few lines later, keymgr invokes key_command. I get the following backtrace: #0 conf_db_get (conf=0x6bfcc0, txn=0x6bfce0, key0=0x47c042 "\bkeystore", key1=0x47c04c "\abackend", id=0x0, id_len=0, data=0x7fffffffdf90) at knot/conf/confdb.c:705 #1 0x00000000004101a3 in conf_id_get_txn (conf=0x6bfcc0, txn=0x6bfce0, key0_name=0x47c042 "\bkeystore", key1_name=0x47c04c "\abackend", id=0x7fffffffe090) at knot/conf/conf.c:109 #2 0x0000000000419117 in conf_id_get (conf=0x6bfcc0, key0_name=0x47c042 "\bkeystore", key1_name=0x47c04c "\abackend", id=0x7fffffffe090) at ./knot/conf/conf.h:138 #3 0x000000000041a516 in kdnssec_ctx_init (conf=0x6bfcc0, ctx=0x7fffffffe180, zone_name=0x6a81d0 "\aexample\003com", from_module=0x0) at knot/dnssec/context.c:169 #4 0x000000000040aee4 in key_command (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe490, optind=1) at utils/keymgr/main.c:113 #5 0x000000000040bba9 in main (argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe488) at utils/keymgr/main.c:359 In both cases conf_db_get is eventually invoked. With a big difference: the first time, the information concerning the keystore id is present, as the value of id - namely, "TheBackend". With this value, conf_db_get returns KNOT_EOK, and the backend id is retrieved as KEYSTORE_BACKEND_PKCS11. The second time, however, the value of this argument is just the NULL pointer. This causes conf_db_get to return KNOT_ENOENT, and the value of the backend is therefore eventually set to the default - KEYSTORE_BACKEND_PEM. What am I doing wrong? What is causing for the second invocation to of conf_db_get to receive an id argument set to NULL? Is this the way it is supposed to work, or is it a bug in the Knot 2.7.3 code? If it is not, what do I have to do in order to get Knot to use the PKCS #11 interface? By the way, I forgot to mention in my previous email that Knot was built with PKCS #11 support all right.

7 let, 11 měsíců

Re: [knot-dns-users] Best practices for knot inline DNSSEC signing and zone loading

by libor.peltan

Hi Sebastian, 1) that's OK. You don't need to worry about that warning unless you edit the zonefile on the signer manually. You can also consider zonefile-less signer, either completely headless (needs AXFR after each daemon start) or with the zone stored in journal (needs some thoughts regarding journal capacity policies). Check "zonefile-load", "journal-content", "max-journal-db-size" and "max-journal-usage" options in config. 2) No, "discontinuity in changes history" is not expected. Could you please describe what did you do before such warning appeared, with longer snippets of the log? In any case, there is no need to be scared of journal getting full, once you read the documentation ;) https://www.knot-dns.cz/docs/2.7/singlehtml/index.html#journal-behaviour BR, Libor Dne 29.10.18 v 13:07 Sebastian Wiesinger napsal(a): > Right now I have two zone types for my knot test setup, one where knot > is doing DNSSEC signing as a slave (AXFR in -> sign -> AXFR out) and > one where the knot is the master for the zone and zone data is coming > out of a git repository and gets signed. > > Reading older threads on this ML and browsing the configuration has > led me to the following configuration and I wanted to make sure this > is actually supported or if there is a best practice that is > different. > > > 1) Inline DNSSEC signing for slave zone. > > zone: > - domain: example.com > serial-policy: unixtime > storage: "/var/lib/knot/slave" > file: "%s.zone" > zonefile-load: difference > dnssec-signing: on > dnssec-policy: rsa-de > master: ns1_signer > notify: ns1 > acl: acl_ns1 > > policy: > - id: rsa-de > algorithm: RSASHA256 > ksk-size: 2048 > zsk-size: 1024 > ksk-submission: tld_de > > > This seems to work fine, zone gets transferred from master (with low > serial), signed and with a new unixtime serial transferred out again. > I'm not sure if "zonefile-load: difference " makes any difference for > a slave zone but without it I get warnings about possibly malformed > IXFRs... > > 2) Inline DNSSEC for master zone from git: > > zone: > - domain: dnssec-test.intern > serial-policy: unixtime > storage: "/var/lib/knot/master" > file: "%s.zone" > zonefile-sync: -1 > dnssec-signing: on > dnssec-policy: rsa > acl: acl_ns1 > zonefile-load: difference-no-serial > > policy: > - id: rsa > algorithm: RSASHA256 > ksk-size: 2048 > zsk-size: 1024 > > > This also works but I get warnings like this: > > [dnssec-test.intern.] journal, discontinuity in changes history > (1540307365 -> 28), dropping older changesets > > Is this expected? Also I read in older threads that this might fill > up the journal. Is that still the case? > > > Best Regards > > Sebastian >

7 let, 11 měsíců

(where) is the python control script packaged?

by Rick van Rein

Hi, You/Daniel pointed me to the Python control library, but I cannot find it in the 2.7.3 packages -- is that forgotten, or am I missing it? Thanks, -Rick

7 let, 11 měsíců

Question about obtaining information for parent zone of DNSSEC KSK rollover

by Maximilian Engelhardt

Hi, I'm having a question about DNSSEC KSK rollover and obtaining the relevant information for submission to the parent zone of the new key. I'm currently using these steps: - running "keymgr example.org list" - manually identifying the new key using the parameters "ksk=yes" and having a look at the created, publish, ready and active parameters. The new key always seems to be the one with active=0 and I also check the dates of the other parameters for plausibility. I then note the tag of the identified key. - using "keymgr example.org dnskey <keytag>" or "keymgr example.org ds <keytag>" to get the corresponding information for submission to the parent zone. Is there an easier way of achieving this, especially without the manual key identification step? Ideally would be a single command I can run and specify the zone of interest and it will output the dnskey and/or ds information of the new key. Thanks, Maxi

7 let, 12 měsíců

Best practices for knot inline DNSSEC signing and zone loading

by Sebastian Wiesinger

Right now I have two zone types for my knot test setup, one where knot is doing DNSSEC signing as a slave (AXFR in -> sign -> AXFR out) and one where the knot is the master for the zone and zone data is coming out of a git repository and gets signed. Reading older threads on this ML and browsing the configuration has led me to the following configuration and I wanted to make sure this is actually supported or if there is a best practice that is different. 1) Inline DNSSEC signing for slave zone. zone: - domain: example.com serial-policy: unixtime storage: "/var/lib/knot/slave" file: "%s.zone" zonefile-load: difference dnssec-signing: on dnssec-policy: rsa-de master: ns1_signer notify: ns1 acl: acl_ns1 policy: - id: rsa-de algorithm: RSASHA256 ksk-size: 2048 zsk-size: 1024 ksk-submission: tld_de This seems to work fine, zone gets transferred from master (with low serial), signed and with a new unixtime serial transferred out again. I'm not sure if "zonefile-load: difference " makes any difference for a slave zone but without it I get warnings about possibly malformed IXFRs... 2) Inline DNSSEC for master zone from git: zone: - domain: dnssec-test.intern serial-policy: unixtime storage: "/var/lib/knot/master" file: "%s.zone" zonefile-sync: -1 dnssec-signing: on dnssec-policy: rsa acl: acl_ns1 zonefile-load: difference-no-serial policy: - id: rsa algorithm: RSASHA256 ksk-size: 2048 zsk-size: 1024 This also works but I get warnings like this: [dnssec-test.intern.] journal, discontinuity in changes history (1540307365 -> 28), dropping older changesets Is this expected? Also I read in older threads that this might fill up the journal. Is that still the case? Best Regards Sebastian -- GPG Key: 0x58A2D94A93A0B9CE (F4F6 B1A3 866B 26E9 450A 9D82 58A2 D94A 93A0 B9CE) 'Are you Death?' ... IT'S THE SCYTHE, ISN'T IT? PEOPLE ALWAYS NOTICE THE SCYTHE. -- Terry Pratchett, The Fifth Elephant

7 let, 12 měsíců

KSK Algorithm Rollover Question

by Sebastian Wiesinger

Hi, I'm currently testing a KSK algorithm rollover with my zone. I changed the signature scheme from RSA to ECDSA. Knot started adding new RRSIGs and new keys and now waits for the new DS to be published at the parent zone. One thing strikes me as odd though: http://dnsviz.net/d/6v6.de/W9AmtA/dnssec/ Looking at the graph the new KSK (54879) is not signing anything right now. Shouldn't it sign the DNSKEY records of the ZSKs so that the chain stays intact when the DS record changed at the parent zone? Kind Regards Sebastian -- GPG Key: 0x58A2D94A93A0B9CE (F4F6 B1A3 866B 26E9 450A 9D82 58A2 D94A 93A0 B9CE) 'Are you Death?' ... IT'S THE SCYTHE, ISN'T IT? PEOPLE ALWAYS NOTICE THE SCYTHE. -- Terry Pratchett, The Fifth Elephant

8 let

geoip secondary DNS with DNSSEC

by Mark Karpilovskij

Dear Volker, it is true that the method for creating a CSK is not explicitly mentioned in the documentation, we shall fix that. You can create a CSK using our keymgr utility by specifying both 'ksk=yes' and 'zsk=yes' parameters of the 'generate' command. E.g. $ keymgr -c /path/to/knot.conf example.com. generate ksk=yes zsk=yes remove=+1y creates an immediately active CSK with a 1 year lifetime. You can check out all possible timestamp settings in the docs <https://www.knot-dns.cz/docs/2.7/singlehtml/index.html#generate-arguments>. Please note that the geoip module is currently not very well integrated into Knot's DNSSEC workflow. For instance, the only way to refresh RRSIGs precomputed by the module is to reload it (knotc zone-reload). One approach for now could be to create a CSK with a strong algorithm (e.g. the default ECDSAP256SHA256) and a long lifetime, e.g. 1 year, and to set the same lifetime for the RRSIGs. The policy configuration could look like this: policy: - id: manual manual: on algorithm: ECDSAP256SHA256 rrsig-lifetime: 365d zone: - domain: example.com. dnssec-signing: on dnssec-policy: manual Then you would only have to perform a manual key rollover while reloading the zone so that the module computes the new signatures. We will update the documentation to include this information. In addition, you can sync the key from one server to others by copying the KASP lmdb database e.g. using the mdb_dump and mdb_load tools. If you have any further questions, let us know! Best regards, Mark On 19.10.2018 10:13, Volker Janzen wrote: > Hi all, > > I'd like to test the geoip module with a signed zone. The > documentation recommends using manual mode for signing. As far as I > know, the geoip information is not transferred via AXFR. That would > mean, that I've to transfer the signing key to the secondary servers > along with the geoip (and zone) configuration. To reduce caveats with > ZSKs, I'd like to use CSK. As a result I just need to sync one key per > zone to secondary servers. I checked the Knot documentation on how to > use a CSK for a zone, but the CSK is only mentioned twice in the > documentation with no example on how to actually use it. Can someone > point me to a configuration example for setting up a CSK? > > > Kind regards, > Volker

8 let

geoip secondary DNS with DNSSEC

by Volker Janzen

Hi all, I'd like to test the geoip module with a signed zone. The documentation recommends using manual mode for signing. As far as I know, the geoip information is not transferred via AXFR. That would mean, that I've to transfer the signing key to the secondary servers along with the geoip (and zone) configuration. To reduce caveats with ZSKs, I'd like to use CSK. As a result I just need to sync one key per zone to secondary servers. I checked the Knot documentation on how to use a CSK for a zone, but the CSK is only mentioned twice in the documentation with no example on how to actually use it. Can someone point me to a configuration example for setting up a CSK? Kind regards, Volker

8 let

DDNS with DNSSEC, is this expected behavior or a bug

by Maximilian Engelhardt

Hi, I'm using a zone with DNSSEC signing enabled that is updated using DDNS. The update procedure is very simple and looks like this: ==> test_ddns.sh <== #! /bin/sh ZONE="example.org." cat << EOF | nsupdate server localhost zone ${ZONE} update delete ${ZONE} A update add ${ZONE} 60 IN A 127.0.0.1 send quit EOF And the corresponding output in the knot log is this: Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DDNS, processing 1 updates Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DNSSEC, zone is up-to-date Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DNSSEC, next signing at 1970-01-01T01:00:00 Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DDNS, finished, no changes to the zone were made Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DDNS, processing 1 updates Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DNSSEC, successfully signed Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DNSSEC, next signing at 2018-10-24T22:58:46 Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DDNS, update finished, serial 1539809849 -> 1539809926, 0.02 seconds Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DDNS, processing 1 updates Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DNSSEC, zone is up-to-date Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DNSSEC, next signing at 1970-01-01T01:00:00 Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] DDNS, finished, no changes to the zone were made Okt 17 22:58:46 backroad knotd[14134]: info: [example.org.] zone file updated, serial 1539809849 -> 1539809926 I'm wondering if the "next signing at 1970-01-01T01:00:00" output is correct as this seems suspicious to me. Running "knotc zone-status example.org" gives the following output: [example.org.] role: master | serial: 1539809926 | transaction: none | freeze: no | refresh: not scheduled | update: not scheduled | expiration: not scheduled | journal flush: not scheduled | notify: not scheduled | DNSSEC re-sign: not scheduled | NSEC3 resalt: +29D23h53m28s | parent DS query: not scheduled Is this expected behavior or a bug in knot? I can give more information or create a proper bugreport if needed. I also recently had the problem that knot didn't respond to ddns updates until it was restarted. I don't know if this is related or a different problem, however I currently don't have more information about this. Thanks, Maxi

8 let

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